II, at 310 (letter from Weil to Cravens). Cravens was eventually terminated on October 31, 1995. On September 25, 1995, Weil informed Cravens that, because she was unable to key, and because her department had no permanent non-keying positions available, Cravens would soon be replaced by a new employee who could “key in” claims. II, at 309 (memorandum from Cravens to Griffey). Joint Appendix (hereinafter “App.”), vol. Later that same day, Cravens forwarded a memorandum to Griffey relating her understanding of the meeting and requesting “as much assistance as possible” from Griffey and the human resources department in obtaining another job within BCBS. BCBS agreed to retain Cravens in her limited duty position in the meantime, with the understanding that her employment would be terminated if she were unable to secure another job within the company. At this meeting, Cravens was told that she had ten to twelve weeks to find another BCBS position (with no keying requirement) via the internal application process available to all employees. On August 16, 1995, Cravens met with Pam Weil, her supervisor, and Lola Griffey, a BCBS human resources department representative. On July 28, 1995, Cravens was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and thus permanently restricted to no or minimal keyboard activity. Accordingly, during June and July 1995, BCBS gave Cravens a series of temporary, “no keying” assignments, including filing, photocopying, stuffing envelopes, answering patient referral telephone calls, pulling microfilm, and helping other departments. Her doctors placed her under a temporary restriction to avoid repetitive motion and, specifically, to refrain from “keying.” As a result of this restriction, Cravens was unable to perform all of her duties as Senior Operations Specialist. In June 1995 Cravens sought medical treatment for pain in her wrists. In late 1993 or early 1994, she assumed the position of Senior Operations Specialist, a claims processing position which required Cravens to spend a substantial part of her time “keying” or typing claim information into BCBS' computer system. Rebecca Cravens was an eighteen-year employee of BCBS, working for the company in different capacities from 1977 until October 31, 1995. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. Jurisdiction in the court of appeals is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. For reversal, Cravens argues that summary judgment was improper because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether Cravens was a “qualified individual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA and (2) whether BCBS failed to comply adequately with its duty under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with Cravens with respect to reasonable accommodation. 18, 1999) (summary judgment order) (hereinafter “slip op.”). § 12101 et seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), R.S. ![]() Rebecca Cravens appeals from a final order entered in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granting summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City (“BCBS”) on her claim pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Feuerborn, Kansas City, Missouri, argued (Larry W. Manners, Independence, Missouri, argued, for appellant. Decided: June 07, 2000īefore McMILLIAN, FAGG and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF KANSAS CITY, Appellee. United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit.
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